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Statute of Limitations in Cases of
Insidious Diseases
Elmer I. Schwartz* and Byron S. Krantz*
T HE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION and technological development
have brought concomitant legal problems unheard of at the
common law. Fundamental principles of law evolved to incor-
porate the changes necessary to rule over a new way of life.
Some of the problems of industrialization have been solved, oth-
ers are in a state of flux, while myriad others are as yet un-
known. This article concerns itself with one of the incidents of
complex industrial progress-insidious disease, as viewed in the
light (or dark) of the statute of limitations.
Insidious diseases are those which develop slowly and im-
perceptibly. Usually they are diseases that develop after the
continual deposit of minute and infinitesimal amounts of dust or
particles of the offending substance. In contrast to the injuries
that follow immediately after the usual form of trauma, the la-
tent and obscure effects of a negligent act are not discernible and
may go undiscovered for some number of years. There is ample
scientific data to show that systemic changes resulting from
insidious diseases occur long after cessation of exposure. Com-
monly diseases of this nature develop from ten to fifteen years
later.' Illustrative are cases in which long term contact with a
noxious substance first resulted in an illness five years after the
plaintiff had ceased using the deleterious material,2 or in which
air pollution resulted in berylliosis which was first manifested
nine years after the last subjection to the noxious fumes.3 In
these actions each defendant raised the defense of the statute of
limitations to bar the litigation. The respective defendants
moved for summary judgment. The motion was denied in each
instance, premised upon the interpretation that an action of this
nature does not accrue until the illness first becomes manifest.
* Of the firm of Metzenbaum, Gaines, Schwartz, Krupansky, Finley & Stern
of Cleveland, Ohio.
1 Mancuso, Medical Aspects of Occupational Diseases, 18 Ohio St. L. J. 612
(1958).
2 Ricciuti v. Voltarc Tubes, 277 F. 2d 809 (2d Cir., 1960).
3 Brush Beryllium Company v. Meckley, 284 F. 2d 797 (6th Cir., 1960).
Plaintiff's complaint filed in 1959 alleged that she was subjected to deleteri-
ous materials emanating from defendant's plant during the period from
1941-1945. The disease of berylliosis, however, did not manifest itself until
1958.
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The circumstances which give rise to diseases of an insidious
nature prevent accurate determination, even in retrospect, of
when the harm to the plaintiff actually happened. Notwithstand-
ing the impossibility of early detection, courts until recently fol-
lowed the then accepted rule that the limitation period must be
measured either from the date of the negligent act or from the
termination of employment.4
Statutes of Limitation
In order to preserve a right to a remedy for this form of in-
jury, some courts have taken the position that a cause of action
accrues, and the statute begins to run, when the insidious disease
results.
At this juncture it becomes pertinent to note the reasons for
enactment of the limitations statute, and to determine whether
the interests of justice are served through modification of the
concepts in order to cope with the problem of insidious diseases.
Statutes of limitation were enacted in England as early as 1236
A.D., and in Rome as early as 424 A.D. 5 At the present time
general statutes of limitation are found in every state. These
statutes take many forms and govern most types of actions. The
obvious purpose of the statutes is to prevent suits upon fraudu-
lent or stale claims, where much evidence and many witnesses
are no longer available.6 The prevailing view is that valid claims
are not usually allowed to remain neglected over a period of
years with no attempt to enforce them. Further, there was a
desire to relieve courts of the burden of adjudicating stale or
tenuous claims.7
A typical statute of limitations reads:
An action for bodily injury to person and property shall be
brought within two years after the cause thereof arose.8
4 Note, 34 Tex. L. Rev. 480 (1956). This article does not undertake to dis-
cuss claims presented under statutes providing recovery for occupational
injuries as a part of Workmen's Compensation Acts. Due to the vast differ-
ences in the acts from jurisdiction to jurisdiction it is difficult to generalize.
The reader is advised to look to his own state to determine if this question
is specifically answered by statute.
5 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law 81 (2d ed. 1898); Sohn, The
Institute of Roman Law 318-22 (3d ed. 1907).
6 Comment, Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv.
L. Rev. 1177 (1950).
7 Ibid.
8 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2305.10.
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In enacting the statutes, legislatures refrained from defining
or describing with particularity when "the cause thereof arose."
Faced with the task of determining the meaning of this phrase,
courts have stated that:
A cause of action may be said to accrue when there coexists
(1) a demand capable of present enforcement; (2) a suable
party against whom it may be enforced; (3) a party in being
who has a present right to enforce it ... No one will contend
that a cause of action can accrue unless it accrues in favor
of someone in being and against someone in being.9
In the process of judicial interpretation the foregoing ration-
ale was overlooked by some courts. These courts held that it
was only the negligent act, not the damages, which constituted
accrual of the cause of action. 10 The first exposure, said these
courts, caused the action to accrue and the statute of limitations
to run. This approach allowed the court to pinpoint with a rela-
tive degree of certainty a definite time. By adding the proper
period as provided for limitation to that act, the court would
dismiss the suit on the theory that the time for commencing the
action had elapsed. In doing so, the courts overlooked the fact
that "the occurrence of an injury, without more, does not consti-
tute actionable negligence." 11 The elements upon which a cause
of action for negligence depends are a duty, the breach of that
duty, and the injury suffered as a consequence of the breach. All
elements must be present before an action can be maintained,
and in the case of insidious diseases, neither the breach of duty
nor the injury are evidenced for some years. Further, until the
disease is ascertained no litigable claim will arise. Illustrative
is the Meckley case,12 where it was not until her doctor diag-
nosed her condition as berylliosis that the plaintiff could first
become aware of who the defendant would be. It is not negli-
gence alone which gives rise to the claim, but negligence in com-
bination with the damage that ensues. Therefore, until there is
damage there is no claim,13 and a statute prescribing the time
within which the action must be filed cannot be used as a device
to preclude recovery in an action never before maintainable.
9 Tobias v. Richardson 5 C. C. (n.s.) 74, aff'd. 72 Ohio St. 626 (1905).
10 Note, 34 Tex. L. Rev. 480 (1956); Field v. Gazette Publishing Co., 187
Ark. 253, 59 S. W. 2d 19 (1933); Street v. Consumers Mining Corp., 185 Va.
561, 39 S. E. 2d 271, 167 A. L. R. 886 (1946).
11 38 Am. Jur., Limitations of Actions 672.
12 Meckley v. Brush Beryllium Co., supra n. 3.
13 U. S. v. Reid, 251 F. 2d 691 (5th Cir., 1953).
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A Changing Concept
A realistic approach to the problem of insidious diseases was
reached in the landmark case of Urie v. Thompson.14 Plaintiff
alleged that in 1940 he was forced to cease work as a fireman on
a steam locomotive because of a pulmonary disease diagnosed
as silicosis. This permanently disabling affliction had been
caused by continuous inhalation of silica dust blown or sucked
into the cabs of the locomotives on which he worked. The injuri-
ous concentration of silica dust in the air arose from the rail-
road's use of excessive amounts of sand beyond that which was
needed to provide traction for locomotive wheels.
The defendant contended that Urie, having been exposed to
silica dust since approximately 1910, must unwittingly have con-
tracted silicosis long before 1938, and hence his cause of action
must be deemed to have accrued longer than three years15 be-
fore the institution of the action. In the alternative, the defend-
ants argued that each inhalation of silica dust was a separate tort
and therefore Urie's claim was limited to inhalation within three
years of filing suit. In disposing of the railroad's contentions the
court stated:
We do not think the human legislative plan intended such
consequences to attach to blameless ignorance. Nor do we
think those consequences can be reconciled with the tradi-
tional purposes of statutes of limitations, which convention-
ally require the assertion of claims within a specified period
of time after notice of the invasion of legal rights. The rec-
ord before us is clear that Urie became too ill to work in
May of 1940 and that diagnosis of his condition was accom-
plished in the following weeks. There is no suggestion that
Urie should have known he had silicosis at any earlier date.
It follows that no specific date of contact with the substance
can be charged with being the date of injury, inasmuch as
the injurious consequences are the product of a period of
time rather than a point of time; consequently the afflicted
employee can be held to be 'injured' only when the accumu-
lated effects of the deleterious substance manifest them-
selves. 16
Logically this view is the most reasonable due to the virtual im-
possibility of detection at the initial stages.
14 337 U. S. 163 (1949).
15 45 U. S. C. A., Sec. 56.
16 Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163 (1949).
May, 1963
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The statute of limitations starts to run when the disease is
first manifested, or, in the exercise of due care, might have been
ascertained. This has been held to be as early as the instance in
which a person became aware of difficulty in breathing17 or as
late as an autopsy.' 8 When the individual became apprised of
his disease, or, as a reasonable man, should have known that his
health was undermined, is a question of fact.19 Whether this is
the date of diagnosis, of manifestation of symptoms or of disabil-
ity, is one phase of this subject as yet unresolved.
As a practical matter it may be said that the statute ran
from the time of positive diagnosis, where that was the first time
the disease manifested itself and made possible a recognition of
a causal relation between the exposure and the disease.
20
Negligence Theory
Prior to the Urie decision the majority of cases ruled that
the period of limitations ran either from the occurrence of negli-
gence or exposure. Under the statutes the right of action was
deemed to accrue when the wrong was committed, and in the
absence of a concealment the mere ignorance of the injured
party of the existence of the actionable wrong would not sus-
pend the running of the statute.21 The courts, in accepting this
theory, adopted a doctrine, wholly impractical in diseases of an
insidious nature, that injuries arise when "first inflicted," and
that subsequent development of disease therefrom does not give
rise to a cause of action,22 since it is merely the natural result
of that which has already occurred.23
'T Piukhula v. Pillsbury Astoria Flouring Mills Co., 150 Or. 304, 42 P. 2d
921 reh. den. 150 Or. 333. 44 P. 2d 162 (1935).
18 McGhee v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 173 F. Supp. 587 (W. D. S. D.
Mich. 1959).
19 Hutchison v. Semer, 361 P. 2d 803, reh. den. 362 P. 2d 704 (Or. Sup. Ct.,
1961); cf., Coots v. Southern Pacific Co., 49 Cal. 2d 805, 322 P. 2d 460 (1958).
In which the court held that an action was not barred when the case was
filed more than three years after the plaintiff knew he had dermatitis which
was traceable to the chemical solution with which he workd, but less than
three years after the work terminated. Cf. Daniel v. Beryllium Corp., 211
F. Supp. 452 (E. D. Penn. 1962), in which the court held that the limitation
ran from the date when the illness was diagnosed, and limitations statutes
were not tolled by reason of defendant's continuing wrong.
20 Urie v. Thompson, supra n. 16.
21 Street v. Consumers Mining Corp., 185 Va. 561, 39 S. E. 2d 271 (1946);
Scott v. Rinekart & Dennis Co., 116 W. Va. 319, 180 S. E. 276 (1935).
22 Ibid.
23 Wiersycki v. Pratt & Letchworth Co., 151 Misc. 207, 271 N. Y. S. 36
(1934).
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This rule has become firmly entrenched and is still adhered
to in a few states. In the case of Schwartz v. Heyden Newport
Chemical Corporation24 it was held that an action against a
manufacturer of a carcinogenic drug was barred because the
drug had been administered fourteen years earlier, notwith-
standing the fact that the patient instituted suit within three
years from his discovery of cancer. The court maintained that
"in actions of negligence, damage is of the very gist and essence
of the plaintiff's cause" and such damage accrues when the harm-
ful substance is introduced into the body,25 not when it is dis-
covered. However, the dissent in the Schwartz case stated:
As the complaint stands, the limitation periods have run
since the pleading says no more than that patient did not
learn of the dangerous qualities of the preparation until
1958, fourteen years after the injection. From his brief and
oral argument, however, it seems that his theory of action
is that the carcinogenic qualities of the injection were not
discovered by him until after the 1957 surgical operation.
If that be the fact, it would be unreasonable and perhaps
unconstitutional to hold that his time to sue expired before
it was possible for him to learn of the wrong.26
Although the negligence theory survives in some states, the
strong dissent in the Schwartz case indicates that even in these
jurisdictions, courts are looking objectively at this problem.
Last Exposure Theory
Since insidious diseases may develop long after exposure
has ceased, rendering it impossible to state at precisely what
time they first came into existence, many cases, in an attempt to
escape the rigor of the theory that negligence accrues at the
time the tortious act, have evolved the "last exposure" doc-
trine.27 Under this approach, the continuing negligence is re-
24 12 N. Y. 2d 212, 188 N. E. 2d 148 (1963), affg. 15 A. D. 2d 650, 224 N. Y. S.
2d 270, affg. 30 Misc. 2d 663, 219 N. Y. S. 2d 98 (5 to 2 decision); 31 U. S. L.
Week 2383 (Ct. App. N. Y. 1/23/63).
25 Ibid.
26 Id. at p. 2384.
27 Maty v. Grasselli Chem. Co. 89 F. 2d 456 (3 Cir., 1937), rev'd. on other
grounds, 303 U. S. 197 (1938); Hercules Powder Co. v. Bannister, 171 F. 2d
262 (6th Cir., 1948); Farrar v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 361 Mo., 408,
235 S. W. 2d 391 (1950). Fawkes v. Penn. R. R. Co., 264 F. 2d 397 (3d Cir.,
1959), was an action brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
for traumatic arthritis, resulting from a series of jolting impacts caused by
an air hammer the plaintiff had used from 1924 until 1952. The court held
that the action was not barred as the limitation did not begin to run before
the employee was relieved of the jolting work.
May, 1963
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garded as a single wrong against which the limitation period
commences to run only from the time of cessation of the wrong.
In situations where a breach of duty occurred on the part
of the defendant, and the negligence was continuous until the
cumulative effect produced disability, it was regarded as a single
wrong continuing for the length of exposure.28 This rule also
produced some rather harsh results. Commonly, diseases of the
type under discussion fail to develop for some number of years.
In instances of that nature, the statute ran from the date of ter-
mination of employment 29 or subjection to the injurious ele-
ments,3 0 and precluded recovery notwithstanding lack of knowl-
edge on the part of the injured party.31
The fallacy of the position taken by the courts in accepting
the "exposure doctrine" was met in the Urie case. Reasoning
that acceptance of the alternative defense would mean that the
injured party would be barred from suit if he left the company,
or even showed that he merely transferred to another form of
work wholly unrelated to the cause of his disease, the court
simply held the position to be untenable.
In addition to the third and current theory that the cause
of action occurs only upon manifestation of injury, a discussion
of insidious diseases would be incomplete without reference to
the fourth theory regarding the statute of limitations. The Eng-
lish courts hold that only that portion of the disease that oc-
curred within their six year statute is compensable. 32 Expert
medical testimony to distinguish the effects within, from those
beyond, the statutory period, is admitted into evidence, and that
portion of the disease contracted within the statutory period then
28 Rowe v. Gathe Corp., 126 F. 2d 61 (7th Cir., 1942), cert. den. 317 U. S.
702 (1942); Plazak v. Allegheny Steel Co., 324 Pa. 422, 188 A. 130 (1936).
29 Ibid.
30 Farrar v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 361 Mo. 408, 235 S. W. 2d 391
(1950).
31 This is similar to the law of medical malpractice cases. The statute of
limitations begins to run in a cause of action for malpractice upon the
termination of the physician-patient relation, whether, within the time lim-
ited by the statute, the act constituting malpractice is known or unknown.
DeLong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N. E. 2d 177 (1952); Gillette v.
Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106 (1902); cf. 9 Wes. Rev. L. R. 86 in which the author
makes a plea for a realistic approach to the use of statutes of limitations.
32 Clarkson v. Modern Foundries Ltd., 1 W. L. R. 120 (1957); cf. Grant v.
Fisher Flouring Mills Co., 181 Wash. 567, 44 P. 2d 193 (1935), in which an
employee was injured by exposure to nitric acid and chlorine gas fumes
and the court allowed recovery but limited damages to injuries sustained to
the period of three years prior to the commencement of the action.
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determines the basis for recovery. If it can be proved that a
material aggravation of the disease occurred within the last six
years, the injured party may recover for nearly all of his dam-
age. This method, which ultimately produces a near proper
result, has been strongly criticized by an English law journal.33
This article concluded that the English courts fail to recognize
that a cause of action of this type cannot possibly accrue until
the disease is diagnosed.
34
Conclusion
Premised upon practical considerations and logic, a cause of
action accrues in respect to negligent acts exposing one to an
insidious disease, only after the disease has become manifest. It
necessarily follows that limitations cannot run until the disease
has been diagnosed. However, until recently this was not the
majority view.
Through what can best be characterized as misapplication of
general negligence rules, recovery by the injured party was often
precluded. In an effort to alleviate this harsh rule, the "last ex-
posure theory" was evolved. Under this theory a defendant's
repeated acts of negligence were viewed as a single wrong, caus-
ing the statute to commence to run when either employment or
exposure ceased.
Finally, courts have recognized, and have taken as a more
tenable position, that the cause first accrues when the existence
of the disease has been ascertained, regardless of when the last
exposure occurred. Absent this view, a condition of damnum
absque injuria would exist. The individual would be punished
for his lack of knowledge about something that he could not
know. For statute of limitation purposes in respect to insidious
diseases, courts now have undertaken to adopt and apply a fair
and reasonable standard to meet the exigencies of the situation.
Recent cases conclude that the statute of limitation begins to run
and the cause of action accrues when a disease is first manifest.
83 102 The Solicitors' Journal, 39 (1958).
34 Ibid.
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